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There are increasing tensions between the First Amendment and the 
common law torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
defamation, and privacy.  This Article discusses the conflicting 
interactions among the three models that are competing for primacy as the 
tort law governing expressive activities evolves to accommodate the 
requirements of the First Amendment.  At one extreme there is the model 
that expression containing information which has been lawfully obtained 
that contains neither intentional falsehoods nor incitements to immediate 
violence can only be sanctioned in narrowly defined exceptional 
circumstances, even if that expression involves matters that are universally 
regarded as being of no public interest.  At the other extreme is the model 
that some expression which, though lawfully obtained, reveals to a wider 
audience intimate private information about another should be subject to 
sanction, as should verbal abuse of a private figure even if there is no 
implicit threat of physical violence.  Some provisions of the American 
Restatement adopted with scant attention to constitutional developments 
have taken, and to some extent continue to take, that position.  Finally, 
there is an intermediate model—now gaining wide-spread support in 
Europe and to some extent in America, even among some members of the 
United States Supreme Court—that expression which does not concern 
matters of “public concern” can be subject to public sanction even if it has 
been lawfully acquired and involves no threats of physical aggression 
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against others.  This Article sets out how this confusing impasse has come 
about and the dangers that this lack of clarity present for freedom of 
expression. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Snyder v. Phelps, 1 the Supreme Court upheld the right of 
members of the Westboro Baptist Church to picket near the funeral of a 
Marine killed in Iraq.  The signs they displayed to express their 
contempt for the increasingly tolerant attitude of the United States 
military towards homosexuals were certainly vulgar and offensive.  
Snyder, the father of the deceased Marine, brought an action against 
Phelps, the pastor of the Westboro church, to recover for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  The picketing was carried on silently at 
an area designated by the police approximately 1,000 feet from the 
Catholic church where the funeral was held.  Although the funeral 
procession on its way to the church came within 200 to 300 feet of the 
demonstrators, Snyder did not notice the signs during the procession.  
He only became aware of the signs the picketers were carrying later 
while watching a television news broadcast of the event.2  Snyder 
succeeded in the district court, but that judgment was overturned by the 
Fourth Circuit, whose decision was in turn affirmed by the Supreme 
Court.3  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, accepted that the 
speech in question might meet the requirements for an action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress but declared that, because the 
issue involved was a matter of public concern, it was protected by the 
First Amendment.4  Justice Alito, the lone dissenter, noted that the 
 
1.  131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
2.  Id. at 1213–14. 
3.  Id. at 1214. 
4.  Id. at 1217–19. 
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elements of the tort “are difficult to meet” but the respondents had 
“abandoned any effort to show that those tough standards were not 
satisfied.”5  Since Phelps did not pursue the point on appeal and the 
majority had proceeded on the assumption that those requirements had 
been met,6 Justice Alito thought that the common law tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, as well as the doctrine of fighting words 
enunciated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 7 could be applied to 
provide Snyder a remedy without offending the Constitution.  Although 
he concurred with the majority, Justice Breyer thought that there was 
some merit to Justice Alito’s view that the doctrine of fighting words 
enunciated in Chaplinsky could be used to justify an award of damages 
against Phelps and his followers and also that there might be some 
situations in which the common law doctrine of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress could be applied to public speech.8 
That at least two Justices thought that there might be some life left 
in the “fighting words” doctrine is surprising.  In the absence of a 
dramatic change of heart on the part of the Court, it is hard to believe 
that calling a law enforcement officer a “God damned racketeer” and a 
“damned Fascist,” 9 the words for whose utterance Chaplinsky was 
convicted, would now subject a person to criminal sanctions since a host 
of decisions post-Chaplinsky have made it clear that hate speech or any 
other kind of vituperation can only be punished if it amounts to a threat 
or incitement to imminent violence and is also likely to produce that 
violence.10  These developments included decisions involving 
demonstrations in front of abortion clinics in which the Court, with 
some dissent, upheld injunctions and statutes that restricted the ability 
of anti-abortion groups or persons to demonstrate or attempt to engage 
in unwanted conversations in the immediate vicinity of an abortion 
 
5.  Id. at 1223 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
6.  Id. 
7.  315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
8.  Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1221 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
9.  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
10.  See, for example, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), one of the many iterations 
of that position.  A recent state court decision, State v. Mitchell, 343 S.W.3d 381 (Tenn. 2011), 
is informative on the need for a real threat of violence.  See also Bible Believers v. Wayne 
Cnty., 765 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2014).  Indeed, there is even some authority that the speaker 
must also actually intend to produce that imminent violence.  See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444 (1969). 
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clinic,11 but they all involved situations in which a reasonable person 
could believe that her access to a clinic was being physically blocked or 
that she was the victim of physical intimidation.  More recently, all the 
members of the Court agreed on the unconstitutionality of a 
Massachusetts statute prohibiting members of the public who were 
“using the public sidewalk or street right-of-way adjacent to [a 
reproductive health care] . . . facility” to reach a destination “other than 
such facility” from coming within a radius of thirty-five feet of the 
facility during business hours unless they were entering or leaving the 
premises or employees, law enforcement officers, or persons with a 
business reason, such as contractors or utility workers.12  There was no 
evidence in the record that the petitioners, who were trying to 
discourage abortions, had engaged in any acts of violence or harassment 
or had blocked or impeded access to the facility.  For similar reasons, 
one might accept that, given the great number of people who might 
attend a funeral, a much larger temporary buffer zone could be justified 
in such situations.13 
 
11.  See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000) (statute forbidding anyone within 100 
feet of the clinic to approach a person within eight feet for the purpose of distributing a 
pamphlet or engaging in an unconsented conversation upheld); Schenk v. Pro-Choice 
Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (preliminary injunction prohibiting demonstrations 
within fifteen feet of the entrances, driveways, or parking lot entrances to the clinic upheld; a 
floating fifteen foot buffer zone around people entering or leaving the clinic struck down); 
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (injunction prohibiting 
demonstrators to picket within 300 foot buffer zone around abortion clinic and residences of 
staff and from property within 36 feet of clinic struck down; 36 foot buffer around entrances 
and driveway of clinic upheld).  In Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), all members of the 
Court agreed that picketing outside a particular residence could be prohibited.  487 U.S. at 
483, 488.  In dissenting, Justices Brennan and Marshall declared that such a prohibition would 
require a showing that the picketing was “intrusive or coercive.”  Id. at 492–94 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Stevens in his dissent declared that such a prohibition required a showing 
that the picketing “unreasonably interferes with the privacy of the home and does not serve a 
reasonable communicative purpose.”  Id. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
12.  McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2526 (2014) (internal quotation mark 
omitted).  The Massachusetts statute in question was MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, 
§ 120E½(b)(4) (West 2012). 
13.  A number of states have adopted provisions prohibiting activity within specified 
limits that might disturb a funeral or impede access to the site of the funeral.  Many of these 
statutes—often called “fallen hero acts” because many of the recent demonstrations had been 
at military funerals—are undoubtedly modeled on federal legislation that among other things 
limits certain activity for a period of 120 minutes from before and after a funeral within 
distances of 300 feet (noise or disturbance of the peace) and 500 feet (impeding access to the 
funeral site).  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1387–88 (2012); 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (2012).  N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 14-288.4(8)a (2011), amended by Act of Mar. 6, 2013, S.L. 2013-6, sec. 1, 2013 N.C. Sess. 
Laws 44, 45, which deals with “disorderly conduct,” prohibits, two hours before and after a 
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In accepting that a scarcely visible silent demonstration 1,000 feet 
from a funeral procession could not be forbidden because the 
demonstration concerned an important public issue, Snyder strongly 
suggests the implicit acceptance by all of the Justices that the common 
law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress could be applied to 
expressive activities carried out in public if the expression in question 
involved neither a matter of public concern nor any hint of a threat of 
physical violence.  This is a troubling development.  It should be noted 
that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is of relatively 
recent origin.  It was first recognized by the American Law Institute in a 
1948 supplement to the Restatement of Torts14 without recognition of the 
constitutional issues that would arise if it were applied to expressive 
activities, and as we shall describe later in this article, it was retained in 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts15 and now in the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts. 16 
Although, like most people, appalled by the behavior of Phelps and 
his followers, I believe that the result reached by the Court was the 
correct one.  Nevertheless, I find the reasoning in Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion for the majority, let alone the reasoning in the 
dissenting and concurring opinions, troubling.  I find it puzzling that the 
Chief Justice attempted to make some accommodation to common law 
developments that, as I shall demonstrate in this Article, have occurred 
with surprisingly little effort made to anticipate even obvious 
constitutional trends.  As we shall see, this almost conscious disregard of 
evolving constitutional trends is not limited to the relatively minor tort 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress.  It has also been displayed 
in the modern development of the more publicly prominent torts of 
defamation and invasion of privacy.  Might the Court now be signaling 
that it may be experiencing some qualms about having tilted the balance 
too strongly in favor of freedom of expression?  I would find that 
unfortunate.  What may in the long run be equally unfortunate is that, 
by breathing new life into the notion of “public” concern—a factor that 
 
funeral or memorial service, displaying within 500 feet and with intent to impede, disrupt, 
disturb or interfere with such service of “any visual image that conveys fighting words or 
actual or imminent threats of harm directed to any person or property” and the utterance of 
“loud, threatening, or abusive language, . . . or yelling” that would interfere with the service. 
14.  RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948). 
15.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). 
16.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 46 (2012). 
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for a time looked as if it had been thoroughly discarded as the criterion 
for deciding what speech can be legally proscribed—the Court is 
perhaps also unwittingly opening the door to the restrictions on even 
truthful expression concerning events which have clearly occurred in 
public space that have been imposed in Europe, including the United 
Kingdom.  To fully appreciate the scope of what is at stake we must first 
describe the increasingly frequent and awkward interaction between 
constitutional law and the common law of torts.  We shall start that 
discussion with defamation because it is not only by far the oldest of the 
three common law torts involving expressive activities but was also the 
area in which the conflict between the Constitution and tort law first 
arose.  After we have laid the groundwork, we shall conclude by 
examining the important policy issues that, whether we like it or not, 
must be resolved in order to develop a coherent body of law delimiting 
the scope of freedom of expression. 
II. DEFAMATION 
In the first 175 years of its existence, the Supreme Court of the 
United States made no attempt to apply the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution to common law torts.  In the pre-Erie v. 
Tompkins17 era, in which the federal courts applied a federal common 
law in diversity cases, the Court of course did hear some defamation 
cases, but these were decided on the basis of accepted common law with 
no mention of the First Amendment.  In the post-Erie period, when the 
typical common law case involving freedom of expression in diversity 
cases was to be decided under state common law, there was initially 
probably less reason to expect the Court to get involved.  The Court 
nevertheless in 1942 did hear a case brought in the federal courts in 
which a congressman had brought a libel action against a newspaper 
that accused him of having opposed a judicial nomination because the 
nominee was Jewish.  The Court split four-to-four in affirming, without 
opinion,18 the Second Circuit’s ruling that, under New York law, the 
congressman had stated a valid cause of action.19  In its petition for 
certiorari and its brief on the merits, the newspaper’s principal argument 
 
17.  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
18.  Schenectady Union Pub. Co. v. Sweeney, 316 U.S. 642 (1942). 
19.  Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Pub. Co., 122 F.2d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1941).  Clark, J., 
dissented on the ground that the majority’s reversal of the district court’s granting of a motion 
to dismiss was based on an inaccurate reading of New York law and, moreover, was 
“disturbing law.”  Id. at 291 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
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was that the Court of Appeals had wrongly interpreted New York law.20  
It did, however, as did the two amici, also make a constitutional 
challenge, but not with specific mention of the First Amendment, which 
is perhaps not completely surprising since the few prior occasions in 
which the Court had held that the principles underlying the First 
Amendment were subsumed into the Fourteenth Amendment involved 
criminal prosecutions.21  By the 1960s, however, some important 
changes had occurred in the legal and political universe.  As far as the 
legal side was involved, the Court had increasingly begun ruling that 
some provisions of the Bill of Rights were word-for-word applicable to 
the states by incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than 
merely expressing fundamental principles that were entitled to 
protection against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.22  More importantly perhaps 
from a practical perspective, the Court had by this time also expressly 
ruled that the enforcement of a state’s common law, even in litigation 
between private parties, could sometimes be considered state action and 
thus subject to the prohibitions on state action imposed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.23  The stage was thus set for New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan. 24 
The facts of the Sullivan case are too well known to require 
extensive rehearsal here.  For present purposes it suffices to note that 
the case involved an action by the elected commissioner of public affairs 
of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, in overall charge of the city’s 
public safety departments, who claimed he had been defamed by an 
advertisement published in the Times that criticized the actions of the 
 
20.  E.g., Petitioner’s Brief at 9, Schenectady Union Pub. Co. v. Sweeney, 316 U.S. 642 
(1942). 
21.  See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); cf. Gitlow v. New York, 
268 U.S. 652 (1925).  Justice Stone’s famous footnote 4 in his opinion for the Court in United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), declared that “[t]here may be narrower 
scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its 
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten 
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the 
Fourteenth,” but made no mention of state common law.  304 U.S. at 152 n. 4. 
22.  See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (right to exclude evidence obtained in violation 
of Fourth Amendment).  Cf. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which 
could be interpreted as presaging that result even for civil litigation involving the First 
Amendment. 
23.  See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
24.  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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police in their dealings with Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and others 
involved in civil rights demonstrations and activities.25  Writing through 
Justice Brennan, the Court reversed the judgment of the Alabama 
courts, which had awarded Sullivan the full amount of the $500,000 in 
damages he had sought from the Times and the people whose names 
had appeared in the list of the advertisement’s sponsors.26  As Justice 
Brennan noted, the Court was determining “for the first time the extent 
to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a 
State’s power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public 
official against critics of his official conduct.”27  Thus began the odyssey, 
which still continues today, to determine the extent to which the 
Sullivan case and its progeny have altered the traditional common law 
governing tort liability for expressive conduct.  It continues, as we shall 
see, because the Court has been unable to muster a consistent majority 
over time as to what exactly are the broader principles underlying its 
post-Sullivan decisions nor exactly how much of the evolving common 
law governing other types of expressive activity might also similarly be 
affected by constitutional considerations.  In Sullivan itself all the 
Justices agreed that a public official who sought to recover in a 
defamation action against his critics could not recover unless he could 
show with “convincing clarity”28 that the defendant either knew that his 
statements were false or was recklessly indifferent to the truth or falsity 
of his statements.  Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg thought there 
was even what Justice Goldberg termed “an absolute, unconditional 
privilege to criticize official conduct despite the harm which may flow 
from excesses and abuses.” 29  Justice Goldberg, joined by Justice 
Douglas, opined, however, that the traditional common law of 
defamation still applied to defamatory statements concerning the 
private conduct of public officials.30 
In the immediate aftermath of the Sullivan case, the Court labored 
to establish the extent to which the First Amendment limited the 
common law.  In the course of that effort it gave some guidance as to 
how far down the hierarchy of public employees the notion of who was a 
 
25.  Id. at 256–61. 
26.  Id. at 256, 292. 
27.  Id. at 256. 
28.  Id. at 285–86. 
29.  Id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring in the result). 
30.  Id. at 301–02. 
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public official might extend.31  The notion that the authority of a public 
employee to exercise discretionary powers was helpful but certainly did 
not provide definitive guidance.  The Court also had to decide whether 
the Sullivan doctrine applied to public figures who engaged in discourse 
about political and other public issues.  And then, after deciding that 
Sullivan did apply,32 it faced the issue whether Sullivan should also apply 
if the plaintiff was neither a public official nor a public figure but the 
challenged statements concerned the plaintiff’s involvement in what 
might be called “an event of public or general concern.”33  A plurality of 
the Court, in 1971, declared that it did in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 
Inc.34  Justice White did not endorse this statement but agreed with the 
Third Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s judgment for the plaintiff 
in that case because the challenged statement was made in the context 
of reporting on official conduct.35  Justice Black in his concurrence went 
even further than the plurality in asserting that “the First Amendment 
does not permit the recovery of libel judgments against the news media 
even when statements are broadcast with knowledge they are false.” 36 
While the Court was wrestling with the ramifications of its decision 
in Sullivan, the American Law Institute was working on drafts of the 
defamation sections for the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  The most 
controversial item in its drafts was its proposal to abandon the English 
doctrine that some damages were presumed in all libel actions, even if 
the challenged statements were not defamatory on their face.37  The 
reporter, William L. Prosser, was seeking to move to what he claimed 
was the majority American position, namely that, in such cases, a 
plaintiff could not recover without proof of special damages for 
defamatory statements that were not defamatory on their face unless the 
 
31.  See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (former supervisor of county recreation 
area was a public figure); see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979) 
(recipient of federal research grant not a public figure). 
32.  Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
33.  Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971). 
34.  Id. 
35.  Id. at 62 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
36.  Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Douglas, who did not 
participate in the decision of the case, might possibly have agreed with Justice Black’s 
statement.  He certainly would have accepted the plurality’s position. 
37.  The controversy is discussed in George C. Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1621 (1977), and concerned revision of 
section 569 of the Restatement of Torts contained in tentative drafts eleven (1965) and twelve 
(1966) of the proposed Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
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defamatory statement fell within the categories that were actionable 
without proof of special damages in slander cases.38  This proved quite 
controversial, and Prosser’s position was challenged as in fact not 
accurately reporting the predominant American view on the subject.39  
The controversy only subsided after Prosser gave up the fight when an 
important decision of the New York Court of Appeals40 reaffirmed the 
English common law doctrine, and section 569 of the Restatement’s 
adoption of the English common law position was accordingly retained 
in section 569 of the Restatement (Second).41  What is remarkable is that 
while this argument was going on the drafters of the Restatement 
(Second) ignored the serious implications of the Court’s decision in the 
Sullivan case on the future development of the common law of 
defamation.  As late as April 27, 1966, more than two years after 
Sullivan, Tentative Draft No. 12 was released, which contained the 
following illustration to section 580 which was retained from the 
Restatement and dealt with “unintended defamation”: 
A publishes in his newspaper a news item saying that B has been 
arrested and charged with murder.  A has received this 
information from police headquarters, from an official always 
found to be reliable in the past, and A honestly and reasonably 
believes it to be true.  It is in fact false.  A is subject to liability 
to B.42 
This provision and the illustration just quoted were of course 
dropped from this portion of the Restatement (Second) when it was 
published in 1977.  Nevertheless, even though the Court was then only 
beginning to work out the implications of its introduction of 
constitutional law into what had previously been considered the 
common law of tort, Prosser’s failure to even mention the Sullivan case 
surely shows an extremely blinkered view of what is relevant in tort 
litigation and scholarship.  The Court’s decision in the Rosenbloom case 
was surely not a total surprise.  In 1969, the Third Circuit, whose 
decision in the Rosenbloom case was affirmed by the Court, had no 
 
38.  See Christie, supra note 37, at 1621–22. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Hinsdale v. Orange Cnty. Publ’ns, Inc., 217 N.E.2d 650 (N.Y. 1966). 
41.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (1977). 
42.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580 illus. 3 (Tentative Draft No. 12, 1966). 
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difficulty in concluding that the implications of Sullivan had to be 
considered in that case.43 
This reluctance to even consider possible constitutional issues in the 
discussion of tort questions continued through May of 1974, when the 
American Law Institute considered for final adoption a proposed 
section 567A which Prosser had first proposed in 1965.44  That provision 
simply declared that “[a] defamatory communication may consist of 
words or other matter which ridicule another.” 45  Over some objection, 
an overwhelming majority of the Institute’s members at the May 1974 
annual meeting in Washington adopted it for inclusion in the new 
Restatement (Second), as well as a provision taken from section 566 of 
the Restatement that “a statement of opinion based upon facts known or 
assumed” was also actionable.46  This decision to include both these 
provisions in the Restatement (Second) seems bizarre for two reasons.  
First, they fly in the face of section 558 of the Restatement47 and 
section 558 of the Restatement (Second)48 that expressly declare that 
“[t]o create liability . . . there must be an unprivileged publication of 
false and defamatory matter.”  Secondly there is no consideration of the 
possible unconstitutionality of those proposed rules of law.  As is well 
known, some six weeks later the Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,49 
declared that there is “no such thing as a false idea” and that “[h]owever 
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the 
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.” 50  
As a consequence, unless an opinion could be reasonably construed to 
imply the existence of defamatory facts which form the basis for that 
opinion, there could be no liability in defamation.  Not surprisingly the 
American Law Institute did not include section 567A in the final version 
and reworded section 566 to accord with the Gertz decision.   
 
43.  Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 896 (3d Cir. 1969), aff’d 403 U.S. 29 
(1971). 
44.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 567A (Tentative Draft No. 11, 1965). 
45.  Id. 
46.  Report of the Nominating Committee, 51 A.L.I. PROC. 337, 339 (1974); see also 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 566 (1938). 
47.  RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 558 (1938) (emphasis added). 
48.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977) (emphasis added). 
49.  418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
50.  Id. at 339–40.  This statement was characterized as “dictum” in Alfred Hill, 
Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1239–40 
(1976). 
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The most important contribution of Gertz to the body of 
constitutional law generated by the Sullivan case was its separation of 
the universe of defamation plaintiffs into two classes, public officials and 
public figures on the one hand, and private figures on the other.51  The 
former, even if they had not engaged in political or other public 
controversies, were required to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the statements in question were false and that the defendant had 
made those statements either knowing that they were false or recklessly 
indifferent to their truth or falsity.52  On the other hand, if the plaintiff 
were a private person all he would have to show is that the statements in 
question were false and that the defendant was at fault in some regard in 
ascertaining the truth or falsity of his statements.53  Only if punitive or 
presumed damages were sought would a private figure be obliged to 
meet the Sullivan standard of showing with clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant knew that his statements were false or was 
at least recklessly indifferent to their truth or falsity.54  Writing for the 
Court, Justice Powell declared that making the necessary degree of fault 
depend on the status of the plaintiff was preferable to “forcing state and 
federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address 
issues of ‘general or public interest’ . . . .  We doubt the wisdom of 
committing this task to . . . judges.”55  Justice White, in his dissent in 
Gertz, understandably interpreted the Court’s decision as “requiring the 
plaintiff in each and every defamation action to prove not only the 
defendant’s culpability beyond his act of publishing defamatory material 
but also actual damage to reputation resulting from the publication” 56 
and requiring all defamation plaintiffs to show knowledge of falsity or 
reckless disregard of truth in order to recover punitive damages.57  The 
drafters of the final version of the Restatement (Second) certainly 
thought that this was the actual holding of Gertz. 58  This is an important 
point because it seemed to make clear that the Court was not about to 
authorize courts to decide what information that was neither false nor 
obscene nor an advocacy of imminent violence could still be subject to 
 
51.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341–48. 
52.  Id. at 342. 
53.  Id. at 346. 
54.  Id. at 349. 
55.  Id. at 346. 
56.  Id. at 370 (White, J., dissenting). 
57.  Id. 
58.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977). 
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legal sanction because a judge might think that the subject matter 
involved did not concern a matter of public interest or concern. 
Whatever the value of the distinction between public and private 
persons might be, the apparent clarity of the distinction enunciated in 
Gertz has been muddied by subsequent decisions of the Court that 
undoubtedly reflect the gradual change in the composition of the Court.  
After the retirement of Justice Stewart in 1981, the only remaining 
members of the Court that had decided the Sullivan case were Justice 
Brennan, who wrote the opinion for the Court, and Justice White who, 
after joining in the Court’s opinion in Sullivan, dissented in Gertz and, 
as we shall soon see, from then on urged the Court to return as much as 
possible to something close to the traditional common law position.59  In 
Gertz itself the Court spoke of the hypothetical defendants in 
defamation cases as publishers or broadcasters, suggesting that the 
abolishment of the strict liability of the common law of defamation 
when the plaintiff was a private figure only applied when the defendant 
was a member of the press or the broadcast media.60  Not only was this 
confusing because, in legal parlance, one who utters a defamatory 
statement has “published” that statement, but also because whenever 
the precise issue has actually been raised, the Court has always ruled 
that the press has no greater freedom of expression than do 
individuals.61  And were it to abandon this position, one wonders how 
the Court would decide whether a blog can be considered part of the 
press or explain why a book should not enjoy the same privileges of 
expression as does a tabloid newspaper. 
Nevertheless, the Court continues to make statements that suggest 
that there is something to the distinction between what are called the 
media and everyone else.  For example, in Philadelphia Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Hepps, 62 decided in 1986, the Court ruled in a five-to-four 
decision that, in an action for defamation brought by a private person 
against a newspaper on a matter of “public” concern, the plaintiff bore 
the burden of persuasion on the issue of falsity.63  That this should be a 
contested issue seems surprising since even the Restatement (Second), 
when it was finally officially published post-Gertz, took this for 
 
59.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 369–404 (White, J., dissenting).  He felt that the way to 
accommodate the constitutional considerations was to focus primarily on limiting damages. 
60.  Id. at 332–50. 
61.  See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
62.  475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
63.  Id. at 775–76, 778–79. 
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granted.64  Even more surprising, the Court reserved the question as to 
whether this would also be true if the defendant were not a member of 
the media.65  Justices Brennan and Blackmun, who otherwise joined the 
Court’s opinion, disagreed with the reservation of that issue because 
“such a distinction is irreconcilable with the . . . First Amendment.” 66  
Possibly even more surprising was the dissenting opinion written by 
Justice Stevens, and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White 
and Rehnquist, who argued that, as long as the plaintiff was a private 
figure, the defendant could constitutionally be saddled with the burden 
of proving truth in any defamation action.67 
What is troubling in this process of legal evolution is not that it is 
merely one more illustration of Anthony D’Amato’s observation that 
case-by-case development of the law, rather than producing clarity, 
often leads to greater confusion in legal doctrine,68 or even that it 
reminds us that, in ideologically charged areas of the law, a change in 
the prevailing public mood as well as in a court’s personnel can 
sometimes make a big difference.  Rather, for present purposes, the 
most disturbing aspect of the Hepps case was the resurrection of the 
notion that the extent of constitutional protection of expression should 
depend on whether that expression concerns a matter of public or 
private concern.  Such a move was prefigured by Justice Powell’s 
opinion for the three-judge plurality in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 69 declaring that presumed and punitive 
damages could be recovered in a defamation case brought by a private 
figure to recover for defamatory statements that did not concern a 
matter of “public concern” without any showing of aggravated fault.70  
The two other Justices who made up the majority, Chief Justice Burger 
 
64.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A cmt. b (1977) notes that this is what 
the logic of the Court’s decisions suggests and refers the reader to § 613 cmt. j, which declares 
that “[r]ecent decisions of the United States Supreme Court hold that under the Constitution 
a plaintiff must show fault on the part of the defendant regarding the truth or falsity of the 
defamatory communication.” 
65.  Hepps, 475 U.S. at 778–79. 
66.  Id. at 780 (internal quotation mark omitted), per Justice Brennan, who quoted from 
his dissent joined by Justice Blackmun and the two other dissenting Justices in Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 781 (1985), which will be discussed 
shortly. 
67.  Hepps, 475 U.S. at 780–81 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
68.  Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1983). 
69.  472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
70.  Id. at 757–61. 
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and Justice White, wanted to overrule most of Gertz and return to the 
traditional common law.71  How Justice Powell could assert in Gertz that 
determining what was in the “public or general interest” should not be 
delegated to the “conscience of judges and juries” and then twelve years 
later make the issue of “public concern” one which judges, juries, or 
both must decide is beyond me.72  Indeed, Justice White, who wanted to 
do more than uphold the judgment for the plaintiff rendered in the state 
courts, felt compelled to point out that he “had thought that the decision 
in Gertz was intended to reach cases that involve any false statements of 
fact injurious to reputation, whether the statement is made privately or 
publicly and whether or not it implicates a matter of public 
importance.”73 
I am particularly concerned about the implications of these 
developments in the law of defamation for many other areas of 
American law concerned with expression.  It is well-known that, even in 
the United Kingdom, it has been recognized that the strict liability 
normally imposed by the common law for defamatory statements is no 
longer always appropriate in a democratic society.74  Rather than adopt 
the more radical approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in 
the Sullivan case, however, the House of Lords in the Reynolds75 case 
broadened the common law privilege of “common interest,” which 
permits a person who had made a defamatory false statement to escape 
liability if he can show that he honestly believed in the truth of his 
statement and that he and the recipients of the statement shared a 
common interest to which the statement in question was germane.76  
Common interest could include business relations, membership in a 
family, or even joint membership in a religious or social organization.77  
Reynolds extended the so-called common interest to include what was 
called a common “public interest.”78  In Reynolds, and the subsequent 
 
71.  Id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
72.  Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339, 346 (1974) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), with Dun, 472 U.S. at 763. 
73.  Dun, 472 U.S. at 772 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see supra text 
accompanying note 56. 
74.  See Christie, supra note 37, at 1627–28. 
75.  Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.) (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
76.  Id. at 192–94. 
77.  See id. at 194. 
78.  Id. at 195. 
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cases which have fleshed out its reach,79 expression that might concern 
matters of public interest included political expression, scientific 
expression, educational expression, and artistic expression.  In extending 
the notion of public interest to include a shared public interest, the 
courts of the United Kingdom recognized that this expansion of the 
common law of qualified privilege was more accurately described as a 
defense rather than a privilege because it was so much broader in 
scope.80  Although Australia81 and New Zealand,82 in following the lead 
of Reynolds, gave political expression some greater importance, the 
courts of the United Kingdom have thus far refused to give political 
expression any such primacy.  This partial softening of the cause of the 
common law’s imposition of strict liability for defamatory utterances is 
welcome.  It must also be noted, however, as we shall soon see, that, in 
construing the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,83 the European Court of Human 
Rights and the courts of the United Kingdom have used the notion of 
public concern to impose limits on other types of expressive activity as 
well. 
While the Court’s decision in Snyder v. Phelps was ostensibly a 
victory for freedom of expression, there are, as we noted at the 
beginning of this Article, troubling hints that through the Court’s 
continued reliance on American common law it might be prepared to 
adopt something like the European approach in a wide variety of torts 
litigation involving expressive activities.  To clarify exactly what I am 
driving at, and why I find the possibility of such a development 
disturbing, I shall briefly describe the parallel evolution of the American 
common law of both intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
privacy, as presented in the American Law Institute’s restatements of 
the law of torts—as well as developments during the last decade in the 
 
79.  See Flood v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2012] UKSC 11, [2012] 2 A.C. 273 (appeal 
taken from Eng.); Jameel v. Wall St. Journal Europe Sprl., [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 
359 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
80.  See, e.g., Jameel, [2006] UKHL 44, [43] (Lord Hoffman).  This development has now 
been incorporated in Defamation Act 2013.  See Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 4 (1) (U.K); 
see also infra note 155.  This Act has supplanted much of the common law of defamation in 
the United Kingdom. 
81.  Lange v Australia Broad. Corp. [1997] 189 CLR 520 (Austl.). 
82.  Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385 (CA). 
83.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].  The European Convention has 
now been ratified by 47 nations. 
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European law of privacy—in order to show how the Court might 
possibly be indicating that it is open to considering adoption of 
restrictions on expression in the United States that are similar to those 
enforced in Europe. 
III. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts published in 1934 limited 
liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, where there 
was no intention to cause bodily harm or to put another in fear of an 
imminent battery, to common carriers for the “insulting conduct of . . . 
[their] servants” to their passengers.84  In 1948, however, section 46 of 
that Restatement was rewritten to declare that “[o]ne who, without a 
privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to 
another” 85 is liable to that person for any emotional and resulting 
physical harm he might sustain.  Since expression is probably by far the 
most common way people intentionally inflict emotional distress on 
others, the constitutional implications of such legal doctrine would now 
seem obvious, but apparently in 1948 that was not perceived to be the 
case.  By the time the portions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
covering this issue were published in 1965, section 46 was revised in a 
manner that perhaps reflected some of those concerns.  The scope of 
liability was restricted by the requirement that the infliction of severe 
emotional distress must be caused “by extreme and outrageous 
conduct.” 86  At the same time, however, liability was extended by 
imposing liability not only on those who intentionally inflicted that 
distress but also on those who did so by their reckless behavior.87  It was 
this provision that was the basis of Jerry Falwell’s initially successful 
action against Hustler magazine 88 for a spoof of him in which he was 
portrayed as saying that the “first time” he had Campari was during a 
tryst with his mother in an outhouse.89  The jury ruled against him on his 
defamation claim on the ground that no one would take the suggestion 
of a drunken orgy with his mother seriously.90  They did, however, 
award Falwell significant compensatory and punitive damages for the 
 
84.  RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 46, 48 (1934). 
85.  RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948). 
86.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). 
87.  Id. 
88.  Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
89.  Id. at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
90.  Id. at 49. 
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intentional infliction of emotional distress.91  The Court, however, 
overturned the Fourth Circuit’s affirmance of this judgment92 and held 
that a public figure could not recover for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress unless he could show, with clear and convincing 
evidence, that the statements about which he complained were made 
with knowledge of falsity or reckless indifference to truth or falsity.93  
Public concern or interest had nothing to do with the matter unless the 
Court was implicitly holding that all not knowingly false statements 
about well-known figures were ipso facto of public interest or concern.94 
A decade or more after the Falwell decision, the American Law 
Institute began the process of producing a Restatement (Third) of Torts:  
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm.  When it completed the 
process in 2011, it retained the Restatement (Second) of Torts provision 
with no significant change other than substituting “emotional harm” for 
“emotional distress.”  The complete text, finally published in fall of 
2012, more than eighteen months after the Snyder decision, now reads 
as follows: 
§ 46.  Intentional (or Reckless) Infliction of Emotional Harm  
An actor who by extreme and outrageous conduct 
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional harm to 
another is subject to liability for that emotional harm and, if the 
emotional harm causes bodily harm, also for the bodily harm.95 
There are of course many ways of inflicting severe emotional distress 
on others, but surely, as we have several times noted and was the 
situation in the Falwell and Snyder cases, infliction of severe emotional 
distress by verbal means is among the most common.  The possible 
 
91.  Id. 
92.  Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986). 
93.  Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56. 
94.  What has not been directly addressed is whether the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress by intentionally publishing false information about someone is actionable.  
For a recent case in which such a claim survived a motion for summary judgment, see 
Holloway v. American Media, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Ala. 2013).  The case is 
unusual in that the plaintiff did not have a privacy interest that would have been covered by 
the false light invasion of privacy action that was recognized in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 
(1967). 
95.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 46 (2012).  Undoubtedly for the sake of consistency, this provision has for the 
moment been incorporated verbatim in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL 
TORTS TO PERSONS § 106 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015).  It would be unfortunate if that 
decision were not reconsidered. 
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conflicts with the constitutional limits imposed by the First Amendment 
are obvious.  Yet there is no clear recognition of these potential conflicts 
in the black letter.  The comments of the Restatement (Third) do 
declare, citing Falwell, that “the First Amendment imposes limits on the 
extent to which state tort law . . . may impose liability for communicative 
conduct.” 96  The comments also declare that courts should play “a more 
substantial screening role on the questions of extreme and outrageous 
conduct and severity of the harm” 97 and should even take a more 
aggressive role in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in any 
particular case than they would normally do in a case tried to a jury, but 
that is hardly adequate.  Statements that “an actor is liable only if the 
conduct goes beyond the bounds of human decency such that it would 
be regarded as intolerable in a civilized community”98 do not adequately 
deal with the matter.  Such language recalls Justice Frankfurter’s 
declaration in Rochin v. California 99 that the touchstone in Fourteenth 
Amendment criminal due process cases is whether the activities 
complained of “offend those canons of decency and fairness which 
express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward 
those charged with the most heinous offenses” 100 or are “so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.” 101  None of these vague and somewhat platitudinous 
expressions are adequate to take into account the Court’s decisions 
expanding the reach of the First Amendment. 
IV. PRIVACY 
If expression is perhaps the predominant basis for an action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, it should not come as a 
surprise that most actions for invasion of privacy likewise seek recovery 
for mortification and humiliation from the disclosure of embarrassing 
facts about the plaintiff.  Indeed, claims for invasion of privacy were 
 
96.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 46 cmt. f (2012). 
97.  Id. cmt. g. 
98.  Id. cmt. d. 
99.  342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
100.  Id. at 169 (quoting from Justice Douglas’ opinion for the Court in Malinski v. New 
York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
101.  Id. (quoting from Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 
325 (1937), who in turn was quoting from his opinion for the Court in Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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alternate claims in both the Falwell and Snyder cases.102  Our discussion 
would thus not be complete if we did not also refer to a series of 
decisions of the Supreme Court rejecting such invasion of privacy claims 
that culminated with The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 103 decided in 1989, a year 
after Falwell but well before Snyder.  That case involved a breach of 
privacy action against a newspaper that published the name of the 
plaintiff, the victim of a sexual offense, that its reporter saw posted in 
the press room of the local sheriff’s office, which also contained, as 
noted in Justice White’s dissent,104 a posted notice that the names of the 
victims of sexual assaults were not matters of public record and were not 
to be published.105  The judgment for the plaintiff rendered in the 
Florida courts was reversed by the Court.106  While the Court was not 
prepared to hold that “truthful publication is automatically 
constitutionally protected . . . or even that a State may never punish 
publication of the name of the victim of a sexual offense,” it 
nevertheless declared that “punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at 
all,” on a newspaper that “publishes truthful information which it has 
lawfully obtained . . . only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of 
the highest order.”107  In his dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice O’Conner, Justice White declared that he 
doubted whether, if the information were true, there remained “any 
‘private facts’ which persons may assume will not be published in the 
newspapers or broadcast on television.” 108 
Here, again, drafters of the restatements did not take into account 
the implications of concurrent constitutional developments.  In section 
652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, published in 1977, the 
American Law Institute had declared that an action for invasion of 
privacy would lie against someone who gave “publicity to a matter 
concerning the private life of another . . . if the matter publicized . . . 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and . . . is not of 
 
102.  Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1214 (2011); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 
485 U.S. 46, 47–48 (1988). 
103.  491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
104.  Id. at 546 (White, J., dissenting). 
105.  Id. at 527–28 (majority opinion).  The plaintiff reached a settlement with the 
sheriff’s department before her case against the newspaper reached the trial stage.  Id. at 528. 
106.  Id. at 529. 
107.  Id. at 541. 
108.  Id. at 551 (White, J., dissenting). 
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legitimate concern to the public.”109  That provision received some 
support from the Supreme Court of California’s decision in Briscoe v. 
Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc.110 upholding a cause of action against the 
Reader’s Digest for republishing an article on the crime of truck 
hijacking disclosing that, eleven years previously, the plaintiff had been 
convicted and sentenced to prison for participating in a truck hijacking.  
The value of that authority, however, was questionable.  First, the article 
in question was an abridgement of an article that had been previously 
published in Chicago.111  Second, on remand from the Supreme Court of 
California, the case was removed to federal court, which dismissed the 
case on the ground that no private facts about the plaintiff had been 
revealed.112  Third, and most importantly, in 1975 the Court had held 
that a father whose daughter had been raped and killed could not 
recover under a Georgia statute forbidding the publication of the name 
or identity of a rape victim.113  The TV station’s reporter had learned the 
name of the victim when he was allowed to read the indictment at the 
courthouse.  In short, the drafters of section 652D of the Restatement 
(Second) were certainly on notice, well before the Court’s more 
sweeping declaration in The Florida Star v. B.J.F., that their attempts to 
state a general rule governing the publication of lawfully acquired true 
information about other people were subject to serious constitutional 
challenge.  Nevertheless, even after the Supreme Court of the United 
States’s decision in The Florida Star case and the increasingly strict 
constitutional limits on privacy actions being imposed by the Court, 
section 652D was, in 2004, accepted by the House of Lords114 as 
accurately expressing the privacy law of the United States and is 
perhaps another indication that the notion that courts are the 
appropriate bodies to decide what is of legitimate public interest or 
concern will simply not go away. 
What prompted this interest in the American law of privacy by the 
courts of the United Kingdom, which had theretofore refused to 
recognize any general right to privacy, was the need to conform the law 
 
109.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
110.  483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971). 
111.  Id. at 36 n.1. 
112.  Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., No. LTL 71-2458, 1972 WL 7259, at *2 
(C.D. Cal. July 18, 1972). 
113.  Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
114.  Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [22], 2 A.C. 457 (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (Lord Nicholls). 
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of the United Kingdom to the requirements of its membership in the 
Council of Europe and then in the European Union.115  Building on an 
expanded notion of confidentiality which did not arise out of any sort of 
pre-existing confidential or fiduciary relationship, its courts have ruled 
that someone who happens to learn, however innocently, of 
embarrassing information about another that is not generally known 
and would realize that a reasonable person would not want it to be 
generally known is under an obligation not to disclose that information 
to others.116  Through this doctrinal shift it was possible, without much 
difficulty, to begin the process of adjusting the common law of the 
United Kingdom to the requirements of the European Convention of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights construing that document.117  In that 
process the courts of the United Kingdom have not had much difficulty 
in responding to the declarations of the European Court that even 
public figures and politicians enjoy some rights of privacy for activities 
that take place in the public sphere, particularly when some element of 
family life is involved.118  For example, the Court of Appeal has held 
that a newspaper could not publish photographs of the nineteen-month-
old son of J.K. Rowling that were taken as the child was being pushed 
by his father in a buggy as he accompanied his parents to and from a 
café.119  There is, however, a New Zealand case practically on all fours in 
which a unanimous court reached the opposite conclusion.120 
It has now also become accepted, as the law of the United Kingdom 
and the forty-six other nations that are members of the Council of 
Europe, that it is the task of the courts to decide what is a matter of 
public interest that can justify the disclosure of even lawfully obtained 
information about another.  The European Convention guarantees both 
“the right to respect for [an individual’s] . . . private and family life” and 
the individual’s right to “freedom of expression.”121  These rights as well 
as the right to “freedom of thought, conscience, and religion” 122 are, 
 
115.  See id. at [11]; id. at [138] (Lady Hale). 
116.  See id. at [14] (Lord Nicholls). 
117.  See id. at [11]; id. at [86] (Lord Hope). 
118.  Id. at [20] (Lord Nicholls). 
119.  Murray v. Big Pictures (UK) Ltd., [2008] EWCA (Civ) 446, [2009] Ch. 481. 
120.  Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA). 
121.  European Convention, supra note 83, at art. 8(1) (privacy); id art. 10(1) 
(expression). 
122.  Id. art. 9(1). 
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however, expressly subject to derogation when it is necessary to do so 
“in a democratic society” for a number of important social, economic, 
and moral reasons including, for example, the public interest in 
“national security,” the “public safety,” “the protection of public order,” 
“health or morals,” and “the rights and freedoms of others.” 123  As 
written, all these rights recognized by the European Convention could 
be seen as protected only against the actions of the state, as in the Bill of 
Rights of the United States, but it was soon authoritatively determined 
that the states that are parties to the Convention were also required to 
protect these rights against invasion by private persons.124  Accordingly, 
as difficult as it might be to determine when a state might derogate from 
such rights for important public reasons, it has now become necessary 
for the courts to deal also with what happens if the exercise of one right 
guaranteed by the Convention, say the freedom of expression of one 
person, was challenged by another person as a violation of his right to 
privacy, which is also guaranteed by the Convention.   
How, then, is one to balance the conflicting value of these rights as 
well as all the other social, economic, and moral interests of the state 
that are likewise relevant in a world of expressly defeasible rights?  If 
that were not enough, the task became even more difficult when, 
undoubtedly prompted by the tragic death of Princess Diana in 1997, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe a year later adopted 
a resolution declaring that the rights of freedom of expression and 
privacy are of equal value,125 a position that was subsequently embraced 
by the European Court of Human Rights.126  It is the need to meet this 
challenge that has led European courts to resort to some kind of public 
interest or concern test.  I have examined elsewhere at some length and 
in greater detail how European courts have sought to devise a method 
for deciding between two important interests of equal value.127  There is 
accordingly no need to do more than summarize those developments 
 
123.  Id. arts. 8–9. 
124.  See, e.g., A. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25599/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611 (1998). 
125.  Eur. Parl. Ass., Right to Privacy, 1998 Sess., Res. No. 1165, ¶ 11 (June 26, 1998).  
The text of the resolution leaves no doubt that it was largely prompted by Princess Diana’s 
death. 
126.  See, e.g., von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶ 42 
(2004). 
127.  See George C. Christie, Freedom of Expression and Its Competitors, 31 CIV. JUST. 
Q. 466 (2012), for a brief recent discussion.  For a more detailed and far-ranging discussion, 
see GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, PHILOSOPHER KINGS?  THE ADJUDICATION OF CONFLICTING 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL VALUES (2011). 
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here.  To say that one must resort to a balancing process does not get 
one very far.  How to get past the equipoise situation is the obvious 
difficulty, and it is to solve that problem that the public interest test has 
been adopted.  Since all the cases thus far have involved someone who 
claims that his right of privacy has been invaded by another person’s 
exercise of his right of freedom of expression, the European courts have 
constructed a jurisprudence under which, once the plaintiff has made a 
plausible privacy claim, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify the 
exercise of his freedom of expression.  The inevitable effect, in any close 
case, is always to give some degree of primacy to the privacy interest 
and thus require the defendant to justify his expression by showing that 
his expressive activities further some public interest. 
These European developments are of course in marked contrast to 
the historical primacy of freedom of expression that has long prevailed 
in common law countries in which, if the expression were true or merely 
opinion, or even just vitriolic, it would normally triumph over privacy so 
long as the expression in question concerned matters that occurred in 
public or involved information that was lawfully obtained.128  The 
sweeping suggestion in section 652D of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts that this might not now be the case in the United States because of 
the developing law of privacy was no longer plausible as the Supreme 
Court of California,129 a leading advocate of the position taken by the 
Restatement (Second), grudgingly admitted in the aftermath of The 
Florida Star. 130  I use the word grudgingly because, in accepting that 
several of its recent privacy decisions were clearly inconsistent with 
contemporary constitutional law, the Supreme Court of California 
indicated that, in its view, the constitutional limitations on the reach of 
privacy law only applied to the divulging to a greater public of matters 
recorded in public records or, if not contained in public records, were 
otherwise of public concern or interest.131  Whether such a logically 
narrow construction of The Florida Star case can plausibly be supported 
is somewhat debatable.  As indicated earlier,132 the Court in that case 
ruled in favor of the newspaper despite the fact that it was agreed that 
the notice with the plaintiff’s name that was posted in the pressroom of 
 
128.  See Christie, supra note 12, at 466, 468. 
129.  Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004). 
130.  Id. at 562. 
131.  Id. at 561–62. 
132.  See supra text accompanying note 103. 
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the sheriff’s office was accompanied by another notice posted in the 
pressroom expressly declaring that the names of victims of sexual 
offenses were “not matters of public record” 133 and were not to be 
published.   
Regardless of whether the California court’s narrow reading of The 
Florida Star case is truly plausible, its attempt to narrow the reach of 
The Florida Star by preserving some restrictions on the publication of 
lawfully acquired true but embarrassing information about another is 
certainly clear evidence of the continuing pressure to force some types 
of challenged expression to meet a public interest or concern test.  We 
have seen that possibility arguably supported in the area of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress by Snyder v. Phelps when the plaintiff 
might be said to be a private figure.  We also saw that possibility in the 
defamation area in the statements of those Justices who are unhappy 
with the extension of the reach of New York Times v. Sullivan and wish 
to reinstate many of the aspects of the common law of defamation.  And 
finally, as we have just noted, the California Supreme Court has opined 
that there still are situations where true statements can be challenged on 
privacy grounds if they do not touch on matters of “public concern.”  
Here again there is some support for that view, quite possibly 
unintended, in the United States Supreme Court’s own decisions.  In 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 134 the Court refused to allow a tort remedy against 
someone who had lawfully obtained and then broadcast the tape of a 
conversation between two union officials engaged in a contentious labor 
dispute with a local school board that had been illegally recorded by a 
third party because the conversation involved an issue of public 
concern.135  While the Court has never recognized that someone who 
illegally obtained information about another can escape liability for 
disclosing it to the world and has recognized that confidentiality 
agreements even regarding matters of obvious public concern are 
enforceable,136 Bartnicki leaves open some extremely important as well 
as interesting questions.  To what extent can one publish to the world 
information he has obtained legally even if he knows it has been initially 
illegally acquired by (unknown) third parties?  Only if it concerns a 
matter of public concern?  Regardless of whether it concerns a matter of 
 
133.  The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 546 (1989) (White, J., dissenting). 
134.  532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
135.  Id. at 525. 
136.  Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669–71 (1991). 
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public concern?  Or should he be prevented from publishing it at all?  
Even to his spouse?   
What we do know with some degree of certainty is that someone 
who lawfully acquires information that has been illegally acquired by an 
independent third party can publish it to the world barring the most 
exigent circumstances.  The Pentagon Papers137 case and the dicta in The 
Florida Star strongly support that view.  That conclusion is supported by 
the traditional doctrine that, even if the publication of information may 
be punishable, there may not be a “prior restraint” on the initial 
publication of that information.138  It is also supported by the Court’s 
decision that someone who accidentally overhears a conversation 
containing confidential financial information may legally disclose that 
information to the world.139  In Bartnicki, however, the Court, as we 
have seen, left open the question not only of whether there might be 
some sort of tort remedy for the republication of illegally acquired 
information if the information did not pertain to a matter of public 
concern but also the question of whether the publisher might be liable to 
criminal sanction as well.  In point of fact, the intentional disclosure of 
any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication by someone 
who knows that the information has been illegally obtained is now 
ostensibly subject to criminal prosecution.140  There does not seem to be 
any case law on what happens if there are no intellectual property issues 
involved nor any connection with any criminal activities, but rather it is 
merely the embarrassing private content of the alleged wrongful 
publication that is the basis of the complaint.  Perhaps even more 
germane is the 2006 amendment to the interstate stalking statute to 
cover the causing of “substantial emotional distress” not only by 
physical stalking, which has often been treated as an invasion of 
privacy,141 but also by the use of the mail or interactive internet 
services.142  In United States v. Cassidy, 143 a criminal prosecution seeking 
to apply the amended stalking statute to postings on Twitter and 
internet websites was dismissed on constitutional grounds.  Unlike the 
 
137.  N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
138.  Id. at 714. 
139.  Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661–64 (1983). 
140.  18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (2012). 
141.  See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994–95 (2d Cir. 1973). 
142.  Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 107, 
§ 2261A(2), 127 Stat. 54, 77 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2012)). 
143.  814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011). 
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Cassidy case, however, in which the “victim” was a well-known figure, 
the statute was held to be applicable in a subsequent case in which not 
only was the victim a private person but the messages in question could 
easily be considered to be attempts to extort money from her as well as 
threats of violence.144  One would think that an attempt to prosecute 
someone for using the mail or the internet to inflict emotional distress 
on a private figure, where there was neither any threat of violence nor 
other criminal behavior, would certainly fail. 
The battle between freedom of expression and privacy is an 
inevitable one.  It becomes increasingly important legally because, in the 
modern world, many thoughtful people believe not only that the state 
should itself avoid infringing the recognized legal rights of its citizens 
but also that it must protect the emotional tranquility of private people 
from trauma inflicted by other people’s exercise of their freedom of 
expression.  One can say that in the United States, at least at present, 
primacy is given to expression when it comes in conflict with privacy or 
other interests involving emotional tranquility.145  How great that 
primacy will continue to be or should be is the matter in dispute.  As we 
have noted, in Europe this preference is reversed.146  If expression 
receives considerable legal primacy in the United States, it is not 
because expression is a more important social or moral value than is 
privacy or emotional tranquility but rather because, for the body politic, 
the political importance of expression is a more important concern.  It is 
said that, in contrast, expression does not get the same primacy in the 
civil law countries of Europe as it does in the United States because, in 
Europe, notions of personal honor have historically often trumped 
 
144.  Decision and Order on Defendant Sayer’s Motion to Dismiss Count One of the 
Indictment and Defendant Thomas’s Motion to Dismiss Count Eight of the Superseding 
Indictment at 3–6, United States v. Sayer, No. 2:11-CR-47-DBH (D. Me. May, 15 2012), ECF 
No. 94; see also Memorandum Opinion and Order, United States v. Shrader, No. 
1:09-cr-00270 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 8, 2010), ECF No. 42, 2010 WL 503092. 
145.  It is this primacy to freedom of expression that gave rise in 2010 to federal 
legislation that no foreign judgment for defamation shall be recognized in United States 
courts if the defamation law of the foreign jurisdiction does not provide “at least as much 
protection for freedom of speech and press . . . as would be provided by the first amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States and by the constitution and law of the State in which 
the domestic court is located.”  Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established 
Constitutional Heritage Act, Pub. L. No 111-223, sec. 3, § 4102(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 2380, 2381 
(2010) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a) (2012)). 
146.  See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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freedom of expression.147  A recent extension of that perspective is the 
decision by a Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European 
Community that a person could require Google to delete links to 
material in the public domain produced by Google’s search engine.148  In 
that case the complainant wanted Google to delete, in its response to a 
search using his name, links to articles published twelve years earlier in 
a large circulation newspaper reporting that his name had appeared in 
connection with “attachment proceedings for the recovery of social 
security debts.” 149  That right could be overridden if “it appeared, for 
particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public 
life, that the interference with his rights is justified by the preponderant 
interest of the general public in having, on account of inclusion in the list 
of results, access to the information in question.” 150  While it is troubling 
that someone could be punished for the publication of information not 
generally known but already published and discoverable by anyone 
willing to take the trouble of accessing governmental or private archives 
open to public access, the decision of the European Court of Justice is 
unfortunately certainly compatible with the California Supreme Court’s 
application of section 652(D) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the 
Briscoe case that we have discussed earlier.151 
V. THE CASE FOR THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE PROTECTION OF 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The strongest policy argument for according the greatest practically 
possible freedom to expression that is not false is that, without freedom 
of expression, a truly democratic free society cannot exist.  That 
necessity is conceded by the people who would prefer a more restrictive 
approach by their agreeing that “political speech” should be given 
 
147.  James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 
113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004). 
148.  Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&do
clang=EN, archived at http://perma.cc/VV7B-6CQX. 
149.  Id. ¶ 98.  The court acknowledged that the article could still be publicly accessible 
through the newspaper’s website.  See id. ¶¶ 85, 87. 
150.  Id. ¶¶ 97, 99.  According to Google’s website, as of April 14, 2015, it had received 
239,337 requests for removal, and it had evaluated 867,930 URLs that had been requested to 
be removed, of which it had removed 41.5% and not removed 58.5%.  European Privacy 
Requests for Search Removals, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removal
s/europeprivacy/ (last updated Apr. 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Z5NP-P3CP. 
151.  See discussion supra notes 110–14. 
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greater leeway.  But who is to determine what are the outer limits of 
political speech?  Other types of expression that it has been accepted 
might, as a general matter, qualify as topics of “public interest” include 
scientific expression, educational expression, and artistic expression.152  
These terms are not self-defining.  Determining what expression is 
actually scientific expression or what is legitimate educational 
expression or really artistic expression is not an easy task.  The criterion 
of contribution to “a debate of general interest” enunciated by the 
European Court of Human Rights is hardly more helpful.153  The 
problem of who decides is fraught with difficulties.  If one is trying to be 
as objective as possible, one might try to find out by empirical research 
what the “public” is actually interested in or concerned about.  
Presumably that is what Justice Powell was driving at in Gertz when he 
separated the universe of defamation plaintiffs into public officials and 
public figures on the one hand and private figures on the other.154  
Surely he was assuming, with some justification, that the concept of 
public notoriety was a more objective criterion than what was a matter 
of public interest or concern. 
One might also say that, in the world in which we live, the fact that 
someone goes to the trouble of engaging in public discourse with people 
who he believes might be interested in what he may say is evidence that 
he thinks that there is a public demand for the information that he is 
providing, especially if he is seeking compensation for his efforts.  In 
Europe, including the United Kingdom, that objection has been 
preempted by the judicial declaration that the fact that the public, 
however defined, is interested in some information does not mean that 
the publication of that information or the expression of those ideas is in 
fact in the public’s interest.155  It is for the courts to determine what is 
“really” or “truly” in the “public” interest.156  It is hard to believe that 
 
152.  Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [148], 2 A.C. 457 (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (Lady Hale). 
153.  See von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶¶ 65, 76 
(2004). 
154.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341–48 (1974). 
155.  Jameel v. Wall Str. Journal Europe Sprl., [2006] UKHL 44, [49], [2007] 1 A.C. 359 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Hoffman).  Insofar as defamation is concerned, the public 
interest and the entrusting of that issue to the judiciary has now been incorporated in 
section 4 of Defamation Act 2013.  Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 4 (U.K.).  The Act also 
eliminated the requirement that actions for defamation should be tried with a jury unless “the 
court orders otherwise.”  Id. § 11. 
156.  See, e.g., Jameel, [2006] UKHL 44, [49].  See also von Hannover v. Germany, App. 
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the courts are adequate to the task and particularly so in a modern 
nation state that is constantly becoming more and more diverse.  It is 
certainly abundantly clear that the content of what are considered to be 
matters of scientific, educational, or artistic interest or of “legitimate” 
public interest, taken in its broadest sense, changes over time, 
sometimes over a relatively short period of time.  In upholding the 
confiscation of “obscene” paintings, in 1981, that the European Court of 
Human Rights agreed might no longer be considered obscene at the 
time it rendered its decision in 1988, it noted that “the requirements of 
morals var[y] from time to time and from place to place, especially in 
our era.”157  This changing public and judicial notion of what is obscene 
is only one instance.  As noted at the very beginning of this Article, it is 
hard to believe that someone could be sent to jail for making the 
statements for which Chaplinsky was convicted.158 
The most that even the most conscientious judges, in large part 
drawn from the “respectable” elites of society, can do is reflect the 
 
No. 59320/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶¶ 76–77 (2004), where the Court rejects the German 
courts’ evaluation and made its own categorical evaluation.  In that case the Court held that 
photographs of Princess Caroline of Monaco taken in public places, such as while she was on 
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60641/08, 55 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (2012) (Grand Chamber), photos of her taken while she was 
skiing on vacation in Switzerland escaped condemnation because they were published as part 
of a story about what the children of Prince Ranier, the ruler of Monaco, were doing while he 
was ill.  One daughter stayed home with the prince while Caroline and her brother went on 
vacation. 
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to the defendant in the sense that to succeed the prosecution must prove to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt (1) that the challenged work appealed to prurient interest, (2) that it was 
patently offensive, and finally (3) that a reasonable person would find such works, taken as a 
whole, without literary, artistic, or scientific value.  That many or a majority of people would 
find that the work did not possess such value is not the issue.  Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 
500−01 & n. 4 (1987).  I for one would agree with Justice Brennan, who dissented in part, 
“that any regulation of such material with respect to consenting adults suffers from the defect 
that the concept of ‘obscenity’ cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity.”  Id. at 
507 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103 (1973) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
158.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942); see also text 
accompanying note 9. 
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mores of the social classes from which they are drawn and in which they 
are educated and spend their professional and social lives.  What they 
would most likely be doing, despite their best intentions, is imposing a 
certain notion of political correctness on society at large, something like, 
but hopefully less corrosive than, the frequent attempts in the not too 
distant past to impose college speech codes. 
There is a final and perhaps more telling practical objection.  With 
the rise of the internet it will become increasingly difficult and very 
often truly impossible to prevent the distribution of offensive 
expression.  Notions such as the exalted function of the press as the 
public watchdog to whom some greater privilege of expression might be 
given are not only unwise but are likely to be inadequate to prevent 
distribution.  Moreover, such distinctions require the courts to decide 
whether blogs or “chat rooms” are really media.  It is chimerical to 
believe that they could accomplish that task without making some 
extremely arbitrary distinctions.  In this regard one should note that 
there are social sanctions that can discourage offensive speech, 
sometimes even more effectively than legal sanctions.  Attempts by 
Phelps to promulgate his “crusade” by displaying vulgar signs at funerals 
have increasingly been rendered ineffective by counter demonstration, 
as when his group tried to demonstrate at Elizabeth Edwards’ funeral in 
Raleigh, North Carolina.159  Although the self-described Nazi march in 
Skokie was given permission to proceed, as it should have been, the 
march was canceled when it became clear that a much larger counter-
demonstration would make the Nazis look ridiculous.160  
I agree that there must be some restrictions on public expression 
even of information that is not false and has not been illegally acquired.  
Most people in advanced societies take it for granted that the state 
should prohibit threats of immediate violence that are coupled with an 
apparent ability to carry out that threat.  There are likewise strong 
moral and other policy reasons to protect children from severe 
emotional distress caused by outrageous behavior, including verbal 
behavior.  There are likewise good reasons to prohibit outrageous 
verbal behavior towards an adult that the speaker knows is mentally 
handicapped, just as would be the case if a person, knowing that a 
 
159.  Andrea Weigl, ‘Line of Love’ Overwhelms Tiny Turnout of Protestors, NEWS & 
OBSERVER, Dec. 12, 2010, at 7A. 
160.  Douglas E. Kneeland, Nazis Call Off March in Skokie; Leader Says Drive Was a 
Success, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1978, at A10. 
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person is handicapped, tried to defend his carelessly injuring that person 
by asserting that his conduct would have been reasonable if the injured 
person had not been physically handicapped.  Furthermore, the fact that 
the expressive activities take place in public space does not mean that 
there may not be reasonable time, place, and manner for regulation of 
that expression.  All people have the right to use public space and to 
observe what goes on there, but no one has the right to monopolize 
public space.  We also do and should punish the unauthorized 
publication of information that someone has obtained illegally or 
through a confidential or fiduciary relationship.  Material about an 
individual contained in public records, if it has been obtained under an 
implied promise of confidentiality, should not be open to the world, and 
public employees who are responsible for public disclosure are quite 
properly subject to sanction.161  In a rapidly changing world, it is hard to 
say much more at a general level beyond, to paraphrase and broaden 
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s declaration for the Court in The Florida 
Star, that “punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all,” on someone 
who “publishes truthful information” (or matter that is not false) which 
has been “lawfully obtained” “only when narrowly tailored to a state 
interest of the highest order.” 162 
 
161.  In this regard it should be noted that the sheriff’s department responsible for 
allowing BJF’s name to be made public settled her action against it.  See supra note 105. 
162.  The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989). 
